September 11 reminded us that terrorism as a method to spread of mass fear is not only used by authoritarian states and dictatorships but also by non-state actors, in this case the network Al Qu'aida. Undoubtedly, what is now called 9/11 came as a shock to all of us although it was not the first instance of spectacular non-state violence and terrorism. Yet it was a unique case of wanton destruction directed at a national and global nerve center. It is different from acts grounded in organizations with clear political goals such as ethnonationalist movements which are usually labeled terrorist by the governments of countries affected -for example, the Basque ETA in Spain or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland. 9/11 certainly has global ramifications which transcend the regional or national character of the organizations just mentioned. Yet while 9/11 may mark a turning point in the history of non-state terrorism, it is part of the politics of terrorism and reflects the changing trench lines and clashes in world politics, in this case the world after the Cold War.
To classify the phenomenon is fraught with difficulties, not least because the term terrorism is itself part of a semantic war. These policy areas have been characterized by securitization. This refers to the overall process of turning a policy issue such as drug trafficking or international migration into a security issue. The term securitization refers to a perception of an existent threat to the ability of a nationally bound society to maintain and reproduce itself. Securitization has emerged in a new academic literature in the field of international relations & international politics, which even before 9/11, has begun to highlight more fundamental concerns about 'new' security issues. Such new security issues comprise very different phenomena ranging from international terrorism, ethno-national strife to environmental degradation, food and energy scarcities, drug trafficking, population growth, illegal viz. unauthorized migration, and organized crime -to mention only the most prominent ones. Most noteworthy, not all of these issues are necessarily state-centered, as in the old paradigm about "national security" (Buzan et al. 1998) . It is thus not surprising that the post-Cold War period has seen efforts to view international migration as an important regional and geo-strategic dynamic with potentially crucial effects upon states, societies and their security (Weiner 1995) . The migration-security analysis extends the nave-gazing view at the OECD world with a more comprehensive analysis including both the developed and developing world.
After 9/11, it is worth noting that mass-cultural fantasies about catastrophes caused by terrorists have been around for several decades. Even academic publications, such as Jessica Stern's The Ultimate Terrorists -published two years before 9/11 (Stern 1999) , start with the scenario of an atomic bomb devastating Manhattan. Quite often, dire and populist scenarios have been connected also to international migration, alluding to the proverbial "other" and "stranger" as a source of threat to "our" jobs, housing and borders, but also more far-reaching ontological threats to the borders of sovereign states, bodily security, moral values, collective identities and cultural homogeneity. Examples include not only reports in manifold organs of the popular press but also academic worst-case scenarios in fields such as demography (e.g. Birg 2001 ) and political studies (e.g. Kurth 1994 ). This connection between international migration, on the one hand, and human and state security, on the other hand, is called here the migration-security nexus.
In such a complex setup, the question cannot simply be how international population movements contribute to create conflicts within and between states. Instead, it is also important to ask why migration has increasingly become a matter of security. Why has the migration-security nexus developed? In other words, why have quite a few citizens in the West have taken recourse to sometimes fantastic threats posed by international migrants even before 9/11? And what are the consequences for immigration and immigrant integration? There is ample evidence to look at the consequences. After all, at least in the discursive realm, the responses to the events on 9/11 by politicians and journalists have reinforced the migration-security nexus, dramatizing a publicly convenient link between international migration and security. Governments all over Western Europe and North
America have not only strengthened border viz. external controls but also internal controls of non-citizen immigrants. In the country obviously most affected by 9/11, the USA, institutional responses have been the most far-reaching. For example, the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which formally opened for business in early 2003, consolidated some 170,000 government personnel from 22 agencies -including the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It is the largest modification of the U.S. federal bureaucracy since the founding of the Pentagon more than 50 years ago during World War Two, and suggests that security threats are now increasingly seen also as internal ones. In Germany, to give another example for the repercussions of 9/11, the reactions first delayed the passage of the new immigration law because governing and opposition parties could not agree on tighter checks upon applicants for citizenship. Eventually, the fallout of 9/11, among other factors, played a role for the law to be delayed indefinitely. These two examples suggest that there is much to be gained from a more systematic analysis of the consequences of 9/11 for the unfolding migration-security nexus.
Towards this end three propositions are posited:
1.1 Proposition 1: Context of the Migration-Security Nexus
The end of the Cold War has widened the political space for actors in the public sphere to focus on diffuse and hard-to-grasp security threats that do not emanate from sovereign states but from non-state actors, involving issues such as crime, drugs, migration.
International migration has served as a convenient reference point for unspecific fears. The depiction of international migration as a security threat in the West has unwillingly contributed to what the American political scientist Samuel Huntington has termed the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1995) . Securitizing migration reinforces the very stereotypes about cultural fears and clashes that politicians publicly deny and abstain.
Proposition 2: Unintended Consequences of Securitizing Migration
Securitizing policies such as stepped-up border controls and stricter internal surveillance of immigrants produces manifold unintended effects. Among others, securitizing policy issues creates higher expectations among voters that governments are actually able to effectively control transnational movements. This is in stark contrast to the past few decades, where measures such as border control could be viewed and interpreted as largely symbolic measures. In turn, the rising expectations generated by increased external and internal controls among the populace may lead governments to continue presenting transnational movements as grave security risks. In the end, this may create incentives for political actors to engage in symbolic meta-politics. It is worth noting that substantial conflicts in countries of origin such as Algeria and Turkey have at times spilled over since the 1970s but did at no time significantly endanger state or human security in France and Germany.
To draw up an interim balance concerning the post cold war period, the emergence of the migration-security nexus cannot be explained exclusively by actual threats to state and human security, as threats to the physical integrity of persons in immigration societies or endangering the institutional integrity of states receiving immigration. We thus need to take a closer look at the political psychological mechanisms of threat construction.
To start with, 9/11 and the dangers apparent are not simply made up. This was a murderous event. We know from research on intergroup relations, intolerance, elite decision-making, and reactions to terrorism before 9/11 that the responses by governments and publics to threats have been going mainly in one direction. The research carried out on these phenomena in various fields of the social sciences such as social psychology, political psychology and sociology arrives at remarkably similar conclusions. Diverse studies have found that external threat results in a broad tendency to heighten in-group solidarity, vilify the source of threat, limit government actions that might assist members of the threatening group, and support belligerent solutions directed at the threatening individuals or group (For many, see Coser 1956 , Cottam 1994 , Gibson 1998 Sales & Friend 1973) . It is needless to say that these reactions can be readily observed in responses to 9/11.
But we need to dig deeper. 9/11 seems to have reinforced the trend towards securitizing migration and immigration -it did not create it from scratch. Immigration -not only when connected to terrorism -has usually resulted in an increase in perceived threats. Even in less dramatic instances not connected to terrorism but to material threats and the import of conflicts from countries of origin into countries of settlement of immigrants, the security narrative demands that fear and objectless fear -Angst -have to be controlled. In the end, the migration-security nexus under the circumstances before 9/11 also dealt with cultural values affected that are linked to ontological security, and thus existential threats. As immigration history shows, foreigners or immigrants were frequently perceived to threaten cultural identity (cf. Zolberg 1987 Clearly, on the surface 9/11 suggested that international migration is inextricably linked to terrorism, not simply in the indirect ways just mentioned. 9/11 was not about international migrants posing threats to "our" jobs, incomes, housing or culture. It was a direct attack and a threat to death. However, the links between international migration and security threats are inconclusive even after 9/11. Migration and security only superficially share the fact that 3 Unintended Consequences of Securitizing Migration -Reinforcing Meta-Politics
The border control initiatives of national states in Europe and North America before 9/11
were politically successful policy failures that succeeded in terms of their symbolic and image effects even while sometimes or even largely failing in terms of their deterrent effects.
According to the Continuing Observation System on International Migration, the estimated number of irregular border-crossings and irregular migrants has by no means decreased during the 1990s -the reverse assumption may render a truer picture (e.g. SOPEMI 1991).
Since September 11 internal and external control of migrants has increased. In particular, measures which try to handle the migrant as an illegal border crosser make him or her more visible as an alien. For example, due to ever-stricter border controls unauthorized viz.
irregular migration gains more visibility. The very collection of statistics may legitimize stricter border controls and could further contribute to the perception of the migrant as illegitimate and potentially criminal, although politicians take great care to accuse the traffickers and depict the migrants as victims. All of this has an ironic side to it because border control is one of the few remaining fields in which major immigration states have shown that their autonomy has not been hampered by growing globalization of the flow of people.
Yet stepping up migration control visibly, governments will have to show that their increased control efforts show visible results. For example, the number of illegal border crossers apprehended may need to go up. And governments have to uphold migration as a potential security threat. Otherwise, it would be hard to justify increased resources devoted to the control of internal and external borders. This creates incentives for meta-politics; following a lead by Harold Lasswell who had coined the term "meta-issue" (cf. Faist 1994): Meta-politics connects social problems and security concerns with fears around international migration.
Immigration can be referred to by politicians in explaining many social, economic and security problems -such as unemployment, housing shortages, crime -without having to give concrete evidence, not the least because the effects of immigration are exceedingly hard to establish empirically with a sufficient degree of certainty. The academic and public disputes over the fiscal impact of immigration are just one prominent case in point (for an overview, see Fix & Passel 1994) . In referring to these fears and in being responsive to the expectations of their constituency, especially politicians from populist parties have in fact introduced and reinforced xenophobic tendencies. This is not to say that threats to security in immigration countries are without any real-world foundation. However, through meta-politics, low-level threats usually gain out-of-proportion significance. Meta-politics also means that political decision-making engages in symbolic efforts instead of offering substantive policy solutions. Of course, all politics has a symbolic content. Otherwise, political actors could not aggregate and articulate interests and mobilize supporters. However, meta-politics unsettles the always-precarious balance between the material and symbolic content of politics in connecting substantive issues such as unemployment and security to symbols which signify threats in factually incorrect ways.
One implication of meta-politics is the ever-renewed juxtaposition and dualism of "us" (the Americans, the Germans, etc.) versus "them" (the immigrants, the Muslims, etc.) which is In general, state security institutions such as the armed forces, the police and intelligence agencies are known to deal with problems such as 9/11 in a way that enables them to use their traditional and familiar solutions (cf. Allison 1971) -in this case ranging from military attacks to increased external and internal border controls. In this perspective, not only increased control of migrants but the whole 'war on terrorism' is a large-scale effort to cast bewildering developments such as non-state terrorism into familiar molds. After 9/11, the state governments and the state security forces have been themselves heavily engaged in the construction of a political threat that can then be addressed by traditional means.
Whether or not the threat attacked bears close resemblance with real-world phenomena is another question.
Implications for Immigrant Integration -Cultural Pluralism
In the country most obviously affected by the aftershocks of 9/11, Muslim organizations and communities experienced a dramatic new situation (Leonard 2003 Nonetheless, these are signs of incipient political incorporation into American public life.
To take a cursory look at a European example, German political life certainly does not offer so much leeway for marginal yet intellectual and charismatic young religious converts to
Islam. This may be, by the way, partly due to the fact that there is much less of a Muslim intelligentsia in Germany compared to the US. After all, migration of the category of persons In sum, whether or not the aftermath of 9/11 and heightened public attention to Muslim religious and political organizations in the US, Germany and beyond will eventually result in increased immersion or even incorporation of such groups in political life, is too early to say.
It may suffice to draw the preliminary conclusion that on various sides the awareness to urgently include Muslim organizations in regular political and religious life has grown much stronger. Perhaps we see increased efforts of political gatekeepers to co-opt Muslim leaders; along the lines practiced for two decades by French authorities, which led to the establishment of a beur-geoisie.
We should also be careful about the impact of 9/11 on wider issues of immigrant integration, such as tolerance towards cultural pluralism. Muslims all over Europe and the USA have suffered increased hostility and physical attacks, especially in the first months after 9/11. For example, in the stronghold of European multiculturalism, the United Kingdom alone, more than 300 assaults on Muslims were reported in the first three months after the terrorist attacks (Eurobarometer 2001 while the French result was statistically insignificant. This is noteworthy because most respondents probably knew from mass media reports that some of 9/11 terrorists lived in Germany and Britain. Overall, the respondents in the UK and Germany seem to be far more tolerant towards Islam than reports in the popular press might suggest.
We can only speculate about explanations for this result. Maybe we need to take a closer look at the realms in which immigrants can legitimately express cultural difference from majority groups. Historically, for example, the so-called 'ethnic groups' in the USA in the first half of the 20 th century could continue displaying cultural difference in the field of religion.
This was not seen to contradict assimilationist goals (Herberg 1955) . Religious affiliation has been a legitimate way to express cultural difference. Such a finding should even be more applicable nowadays, as cultural pluralist tendencies have certainly gained increased acceptance over the past decades in the USA and Europe.
Conclusion: Vicious and Virtuous Transnationalization
The responses to 9/11 and their consequences, such as a rise in meta-politics and discussions on the accommodation of Muslims in Western immigration countries, have profound implications for a research agenda on migration and security. So far, there is an imbalance in research on migration and security. Following public discourses, migration scholars have mostly either defensively argued against making a link between migration and terrorism or have pointed out substantial security threats for people and states emanating out of civil wars, refugee flows, and nationalist struggles involving categories such as militant refugee warriors. Without denying the importance of such analyses, it is vital that they be complemented by two extensions. Obviously, the first task includes the rigorous study of the meta-politics of migration and security as part of migration politics. This does not only include the study of anti-immigrant violence but also the rhetoric of regular immigration politics and thus the securitization of migration and integration issues.
The second task is to extend our knowledge not only about the role of transnational processes in order to counter the easy linkage made between international migration and terrorism. This implies that we not only study the import viz. export of conflicts through international migration such as 'long-distance nationalism' (Benedict Anderson) but also more virtuous cycles of transnationalization such as the diffusion of human and civil rights with the help of émigrés, migrants and refugees. 9/11 has once again confirmed what has already been evident from less spectacular forms and manifestations of international terrorism: the growing importance of non-state actors in the contemporary world system (cf. Held et al. 1999 ). This implies a study of political, economic and cultural transnationalization in all its facets. In this way we can hope to unearth both the vicious and the virtuous cycles of transnational processes.
This research emphasis would constitute one modest step towards removing fuzzy fantasies about the proverbial "stranger" and "migrant" as a security threat. This is important because, at first sight, the events of 9/11 have dealt another devastating blow to the Kantian utopia of perpetual peace. Yet, we need to be aware of the ambiguous dynamics of globalization. The age of globalization demands to renew Kant's vision. Immanuel Kant argued that perpetual peace is possible in a system of republics, which we would now call liberal democracies, governed by the rule of law (Kant 1970) . He wrote about a federation of states as one guaranty of peace. Nowadays this vision has to be supplemented by an empirical analysis of how transnationalizing civil societies may underpin the diffusion of human, civil and political rights. We thus should not only think about the ordering of the 'world of states' as a prerequisite for a more peaceful global order. Instead, we certainly need to include the 'world of societies'. Sometimes we then find ourselves indeed studying instances and vicious cycles of non-state violence crossing borders. This is important because there is a definite trend in our post-Westphalian political world, in which the sovereign powers of states are challenged and essential elements such as territoriality transformed -without being replaced (Ruggie 1993 ). International migration is one of the fields in which this can be exemplified. After all, international migrants actively voice ideas and interests in this transnational realm. This could act as a corrective to the current overemphasis on the migration-security nexus. In
